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AFDC ELIGIBILITY: A CASE FOR
FEDERAL STANDARDS
The Aid To Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) program,
included in the Social Security Act of 1935,1 was designed by Congress to
provide financial assistance to needy children in families lacking parental sup-
port. 2 Forty-five states had poor laws and mothers' pension statutes at that
time, but their operation and effectiveness were hampered by the financial
difficulties of the Depression.3 AFDC provides federal matching funds 4 to
those states that elect to participate if their assistance plans comply with cer-
tain requirements contained in the Act and the regulations promulgated pur-
suant to the Act by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.5
However, the precise roles of the federal and state governments in the
administration of the AFDC program have not always been clear.
The statutory scheme affords the states wide latitude in determining the
"standard of need" and the level of financial benefits to be granted to recipi-
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1396 (1970). The AFDC program is set out at 42 U.S.C. §§
601-644 (1970).
2. See HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 10 (1935). The House report emphasized that the program would enable these
children to remain in their own homes rather than being placed in institutions. The
Act itself clearly elaborates this purpose:
[E]ncouraging the care of dependent children in their own homes or in the
homes of relatives....
. . . to help maintain and strengthen family life and to help such parents or
relatives to attain or retain capability for the maximum self-support and per-
sonal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental
care and protection . . . [funds for AFDC are appropriated].
42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970).
3. See SENATE FINANCE COMM., S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1935).
4. The federal government originally paid one-third of the states' program costs, but
this proportion has been amended several times since 1935. Under the current "match-
ing formula," federal funding varies between approximately 50% and 80% of total state
AFDC expenditures. See 42 U.S.C. § 603 (a) (1) (A) (1970). For the most recent per-
centages of federal funding of the various state plans, see U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCA-
TION AND WELFARE, CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE PLANS FOR AID To FAMILIES WITH DE-
PENDENT CHILDERN 230 (1974 ed.).
5. See generally 45 C.F.R. §§ 200-304.30 (1976). The cooperative nature of the
program was described by the Supreme Court in these terms:
The AFDC program is based on a scheme of cooperative federalism . . . . It
is financed largely by the Federal Government, on a matching fund basis, and
Catholic University Law Review
ents.6 Although those determinations are subject to certain statutory limita-
tions, 7 the Supreme Court generally has confirmed state financial deter-
minations as valid exercises of the state fiscal autonomy envisioned by the
Act." However, controversy over the roles of the federal and state govern-
ments regarding determination of non-financial eligibility requirements and
the proper interpretation of the non-financial eligibility provisions contained
in the Act continues.
These legal uncertainties stem from the interpretation of, and relationship
between, two sections of the Act. Section 402(a)(10) provides: "[A]id to
families with dependent children shall . . . be furnished with reasonable
promptness to -all eligible individuals." Although this language mandates
assistance to all persons deemed eligible, it does not resolve the question of
who in fact is eligible. Section 406(a) provides the statutory definition of
dependent child:
The term "dependent child" means a needy child (1) who has
is administered by the States. States are not required to participate in the pro-
gram, but those which desire to take advantage of the substantial federal
funds available for distribution to needy children are required to submit an
AFDC plan for the approval of the Secretary of Health, Education and Wel-
fare . . . . The plan must conform with several requirements of the Social
Security Act and with rules and regulations promulgated by HEW.
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316-17 (1968). Every state, plus the District of Columbia,
Guam, the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico, has elected to participate in the AFDC pro-
gram.
6. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318 n.14 (1968), citing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION AND WELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, pt. IV, § 3120 (1966)
(current version contained in scattered sections of 45 C.F.R.). The HEW manual estab-
lished that each participating state must determine the standard of need for eligible indi-
viduals, and that this standard may vary according to the economic conditions existing
in each state. Also, the legislative history of the Act clearly shows that states may de-
termine who is financially "needy" for purposes of AFDC eligibility. See H.R. REP.
No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1935); S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 36
(1935). The standard of need is that amount of money determined necessary to sustain
a family for each month. The level of benefits actually paid by each state may be a
percentage of the standard of need. See note 8 & accompanying text infra.
7. See, e.g., sections 402(a)(7) and (8), which require that states disregard a spec-
ified percentage of all earned income, as well as work expenses, in the state determina-
tion of need. This provision was intended as a work incentive. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)
(7)-(8) (Supp. V 197.5). In addition, section 402(a)(23) requires that, effective July
1, 1969, all state standards of need be adjusted to reflect cost of living increases. 42 U.S.
C. § 602(a) (23) (Supp. V 1975).
8. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (upholding a Texas com-
putation scheme designed to reduce the amount of benefits available to some recipients);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding the state's right to impose a
maximum ceiling on all AFDC grants regardless of the size of the family and its actual
need); But see Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251 (1974) (prohibiting states from placing
ceilings on the deductible work expense allowance).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (10) (Supp. V 1975).
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been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death,
continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity
of a parent, and who is living with his father, mother, grandfather,
grandmother . . . in a place or residence maintained by one or
more of such relatives as his or their own home, and (2) who is
(A) under the age of eighteen, or (B) under the age of twenty-two
and (as determined by the Secretary) a student regularly attending
a school, college or university, or a course of vocational or tech-
nical training designed to prepare him for gainful employment. 10
The difficulty in interpreting these sections has been whether the section
406 definition of eligible individuals, including the definition of "dependent
child," provides an exclusive federal definition, or whether the section
implicitly gives states the power to define eligible individuals more nar-
rowly than the section 406 definition or to impose additional conditions on
eligibility not expressly contained in the Act. It is this author's contention
that an interpretation of section 406 as an exclusive federal definition, which
states are not free to restrict, accurately reflects both the Act's statutory
scheme and purpose and the judicial interpretations of the Act, and that such
a definition also results in a more precise delineation of the federal and state
roles in the administration of the AFDC program.
I. THE HEW INTERPRETATION: "CONDITION X"
Charged by Congress with the administration of the AFDC program, the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) has promulgated
regulations for measuring state AFDC plans against the statutory scheme."
In interpreting sections 402 and 406 of the Act, the agency determined that
section 402 contains the only requirements with which state plans must com-
ply,12 and that section 402 does not implicitly incorporate the definitions of
section 406 by reference.13 Section 402 was therefore interpreted by HEW
as exhausting those statutory requirements that were mandatory in state plans,
while section 406 was seen as providing merely the broadest range of plan
coverage for which federal funds were available. Nevertheless, states were
10. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970) (amended 1975).
11. 45 C.F.R. §§ 200-304.30 (1976).
12. See Lander, AFDC Eligibility Under the Social Security Act: Reaping the Har-
vest of King v. Smith, 4 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 180 (1970); Comment, Welfare's "Con-
dition X", 76 YALE L.J. 1222 (1967).
13. See also 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1970) (the definition of dependent child was expanded
to include children of unemployed fathers). Coverage is not automatic but is left op-
tional with the states if they choose to comply with requirements set forth at 42 U.S.C.
§ 607(c), (d) (1970) (amended 1976).
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not wholly free, under this interpretation of the Act, arbitrarily to restrict
the class of eligible individuals.
To assure the reasonableness of state restrictions the agency promulgated
the doctrine of "equitable treatment" or "Condition X."'1 4 This doctrine was
applied by the agency "to prohibit arbitrary exclusions of persons who come
within the scope of . . . [section 406], where the criteria upon which the
exclusion is based bear no reasonable relationship to the purpose or scheme
of the federal statute." 15 Imposition of "Condition X" was thus an agency-
created exception to HEW's proposition that the only requirements manda-
tory upon the states are those expressly enumerated in section 402.16 Al-
though there was no express authority for such a standard in the Act, HEW
maintained that it was necessary to prevent restrictive state plan provisions
from defeating the primary purpose of the Act: "to get money into the hands
of needy people."' 17  Thus, in the absence of "Condition X," the HEW inter-
pretation of the statutory scheme might have allowed approval of state plans
that denied aid to the very persons the Act was intended to assist.
In reality, the application of "condition X" by HEW seldom has resulted
in disapproval of state plans.' s The review standard, despite these "equi-
table" restrictions, has operated primarily to allow HEW's approval of state
plans covering fewer individuals than would meet the eligibility criteria of
14. Although this standard was first codified in 1971, 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(1)
(1971), HEW had been examining state plans for several years before 1971 using "Con-
dition X" as an internal standard of review. For an excellent discussion of the early
operation of "Condition X", see Comment, supra note 12.
15. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 10, Barksdale v. Shea, Civ. No. C-
1967 (D. Colo., filed Feb. 26, 1971) consolidated with, Digesualddo v. Shea, Civ. No.
C-1827 (D. Colo. Mar. 1, 1971), (mem.), discussed in [1972] Pov. L. REP. (CCH)
15,238.
16. See Lander, supra note 12, at 203.
17. F. White, Equitable Treatment Under the Public Assistance Titles 5 (Nov. 5,
1963) (staff paper prepared for HEW Regional Attorneys' meeting). The author, not-
ing that her views were not necessarily those of HEW, maintained that one basis of
"Condition X" was the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at
4-8. However, whether "Condition X" is viewed as statutorily or constitutionally based,
it came to be known as the unspecified condition within section 402, and thus named
402 "(a)(x)." Id. at 8 n.9.
18. In one early case, HEW invalidated a Georgia quota system which contained
racial limitations. In another, federal aid to Arizona was terminated because the wel-
fare program denied benefits to Indians. In 1950, HEW invoked Condition X to warn
states that federal matching funds would be terminated if state plans excluded illegiti-
mate children. See Comment, supra note 12, at 1222-23; Comment, AFDC Eligibility
Requirements Unrelated to Need: The Impact of King v. Smith, 118 U. PA. L. REV.
1219, 1223 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Comment, AFDC Eligibility Requirements].
One commentator has even suggested that HEW has acted politically in applying "Con-
dition X"]. See G. STEINER, SOCIAL INSECURrrY: THE POLITICS OF WELFARE (1966).
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section 406. However, while this agency interpretation allows states to aid
fewer individuals than would qualify under the statutory definition, the stat-
ute is susceptible to an alternative interpretation.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION:
King v. Smith
In its first interpretation of section 406 of the AFDC program, the
Supreme Court held that the section imposed a mandatory definition of
eligible individuals. In King v. Smith,19 it was alleged that an Alabama wel-
fare regulation was violative of both the Social Security Act and the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The state regulation, known
as the "man-in-the-house" rule, provided that a man who visited an AFDC
home for the purpose of cohabiting with the mother, or who cohabited with
the mother elsewhere, was deemed a "substitute father" of the children. 20
The state argued that with such a "father," the children were ineli-
gible under section 406, because the children were not "deprived of parental
support or care."' 21 Thus, the mother's conduct precluded her admittedly
needy children from coming within the section 406 definition of "dependent
child." 22
Two state interests were asserted in justification of including "substitute
fathers" within the definition of "parent": (1) To discourage illicit sexual re-
lationships and illegitimate births, and (2) to equate the state treatment of
families with informal "marital" relationships and families with traditional
marital relationships. 23 Contending that the state definition was violative of
19. 392 U.S. 309 (1968). This was also the first AFDC case to be given plenary
consideration by the Supreme Court. It has only been since the mid-1960's that welfare
recipients have been engaged in active efforts to assert their legal rights. See THE NA-
TION, May 8, 1967, at 582-85. See also Barrett, The New Role of the Courts in Devel-
oping Public Welfare Law, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1.
20. Id. at 327. See Comment, AFDC Eligibility Requirements, supra note 18, at
1228.
21. The Alabama Manual for Administration of Public Assistance, pt. I, c. II, § VI,
par. V (1964), cited, 319 U.S. at 314 n.9, stated:
Under the regulations, an able-bodied man, married or single, is considered a
substitute father of all the children of the applicant . . . mother if (1) he lives
in the home with the mother for the purpose of cohabitation; or (2) if he visits
frequently for the purpose of cohabiting with the mother; or (3) if he does
not frequent the home but cohabits with the mother elsewhere. When "there
appears to be a substitute father," the mother bears the burden of proving that
she has discontinued her relationship with the man before her AFDC assist-
ance will be resumed.
22. See Alabama Manual, supra note 21.
23. 392 U.S. at 318.
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both "Condition X" and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the plaintiff argued that the state regulation was not rationally related
to the purpose of the AFDC program in that it arbitrarily created two classi-
fications of needy children: (1) those whose mothers were engaged in illicit
sexual relationships, and (2) those whose mothers were not engaged in illicit
sexual relationships. 24
A three-judge district court panel invalidated the regulation. 25 The court
did not specifically consider the application of "Condition X," but did hold
that such a denial of aid "bestow[ed] the benefits of the program upon some
needy children and arbitrarily den[ied] them to others"26 in violation of the
equal protection doctrine.27 The mothers' alleged sexual immorality was
"unrelated to and in conflict with the purposes of the AFDC program."' 28
Although the lower court holding had been based on constitutional grounds,
and the parties' briefs filed with the Supreme Court had argued only the "Con-
dition X" and constitutional issues, the Court chose to analyze the question
on different statutory grounds. The Court first examined the section 406
definition of dependent child to determine whether Congress intended
''parent" to include "substitute fathers." Relying in part on the legislative
history of the Act, the Court found that "Congress intended the term 'parent'
in section 406(a) . . .to include only those persons with a legal duty of sup-
port."'29 As Alabama included no such duty in its definition of "substitute
fathers," the Court concluded that the paramour-substitute father was not a
parent within the meaning of section 406(a). 30  Consequently, under this
"federal definition," the plaintiff's children were dependent children and were
24. Brief for Appellee at 20-21, King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). This classifi-
cation was the basis of the appellee's "Condition X" argument. See Comment, AFDC
Eligibility Requirements, supra note 18, at 1225.
25. Smith v. King 277 F. Supp. 31 (M.D. Ala. 1967). 29 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) pro-
vided for a three-judge court to hear cases seeking injunctive relief against enforcement
of an allegedly unconstitutional state statute, and for direct appeal to the Supreme Court.
This provision was repealed, however, by the Three-Judge Court Amendments of Aug.
12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119.
26. 277 F. Supp. at 38.
27. Id. at 39.
28. Id. at 41.
29. 392 U.S. at 327. The Court relied on the stated purpose of the Act: "to provide
programs for the economic security and protection of all children." The Court recog-
nized the congressional intent to aid, through the AFDC program, those children who
would not be assisted through other programs designed to provide work for the breadwin-
ners of families. It was clear, the Court held, that AFDC was designed to aid children
without a "breadwinner," "wage earner" or "father," and to describe the sort of bread-
winner that it had in mind, Congress employed the word "parent." Id. at 328-29. See
Comment, AFDC Eligibility Requirements, supra note 18, at 1228.
30. 392 U.S. at 327.
[Vol 26:547
AFDC Eligibility
entitled to assistance pursuant to the mandate of section 402 (a)(10) that "aid
...be furnished. . . to all eligible individuals."''3
In response to Alabama's contention that its regulation aided the efficient
administration of the Act, promoted fiscal integrity, and, most importantly,
discouraged immorality, the Court conceded that these were legitimate state
interests. The Court stressed, however, that the paramount goal of the
AFDC program was the protection of dependent children and that Congress
intended such state concerns to be effectuated in other ways.3 2 In addition,
the Court noted that depriving a child of assistance on the basis of the alleged
impropriety of the mother was a throwback to the 19th century concept of
welfare for the "worthy poor," as evidenced by mothers' pension programs, 33
and had no place in a contemporary interpretation of the AFDC program.
Although HEW had been "negotiating" with Alabama for almost ten years
before the Court decision, and had not invalidated this state regulation,3 4 the
agency did not brief "Condition X" to either the lower court or the Supreme
Court. Indeed, the agency did not clarify its interpretation of sections 402
(a)(10) and 406(a) before a court until 1971, three years after the King
decision, in Digesualdo v. Shea.3 5
The HEW amicus brief in Digesualdo very clearly explained the agency's
position. In Digesualdo, the plaintiffs had challenged a Colorado regulation
which denied AFDC benefits to sixteen and seventeen year old children solely
31. The Court stated:
In combination, these two provisions of the Act [Section 402(a)(10)-aid
... to all eligible individuals, and section 406(a)--definition of dependent
child] clearly require participating states to furnish aid to families with chil-
dren who have a parent absent from the home, if such families are in other
respects eligible.
Id. at 317. The Court went on to hold: "Alabama has breached its federally imposed
obligation to furnish 'aid to families with dependent children ... with reasonable
promptness to all eligible individuals .... '" Id. at 333.
32. In sum, Congress has determined that immorality and illegitimacy should be
dealt with through rehabilitative measures rather than measures that punish de-
pendent children, and that protection of such children is the paramount goal
of AFDC. In light of the Flemming Ruling [a prohibition against state denials
of assistance on the basis of unsuitable home conditions] ...it is simply in-
conceivable ... that Alabama is free to discourage immorality and illegiti-
macy by the device of absolute disqualification of needy children.
Id. at 325-26 (footnotes omitted).
33. For an excellent discussion of this concept, see W. BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT
CHILDREN (1965).
34. For a discussion of the correspondence between HEW and the State of Alabama
regarding the validity of the "man-in-the-house-rule," see STEINER, supra note 18, at
118; 392 U.S. at 326 n.23.
35. Civ. No. C-1827 (D. Colo., Mar. 1, 1971) (mem.), discussed in [1972] Pov.
L. REP. (CCH) 15,238.
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because they were not in school, despite the fact that section 406(a)
specifically defines "dependent child" as including children of this age regard-
less of their school attendance.36  HEW argued that "the purpose of section
406 of the Social Security Act is to delineate the maximum scope of federal
financial participation available to state AFDC programs and [the purpose]
generally is not to set requirements with which those programs must com-
ply."'8 7 Therefore, under HEW's view of the statutory scheme, Colorado
could include these children in its program but was not required to include
them.
Recognizing that "King v. Smith . . . contains language which appears to
suggest a result inconsistent with that urged by this brief,"8' a and agreeing that
King had properly defined "parent," the HEW brief contended that the King
analysis was not applicable to other definitional questions arising under sec-
tion 406. Rather, HEW argued that King had established only "that one
word of the definition of 'dependent child,' i.e., the term 'parent,' precludes
a State definition that introduces a 'transparent fiction' . . . . In this one re-
spect (but not in most others) a State departure from the Federal definition
leads to a frustration of basic Congressional intent; . . .,,3" The Colorado
choice to exclude sixteen and seventeen-year-old children who were not in
school did not, in HEW's view, similarly frustrate congressional intent; nor
was it an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of state discretion sufficient to
violate "Condition X. ' '40
The three-judge district court agreed, relying heavily on HEW's amicus
brief, that section 402 contained the strict requirements for state AFDC plans
and that section 406 delineated only the maximum scope of federal financial
participation. Employing this rationale, the court concluded that the Colo-
rado exclusion was not an unreasonable or arbitrary restriction but was in-
tended to maximize the self-sufficiency of families. 41  The Digesualdo
decision carefully focused on the Colorado regulation in light of the legislative
history elaborated in the HEW brief.42 It was not clear whether the court
considered its analysis generally applicable to section 406 eligibility questions.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a)(2)(A) (1970).
37. Brief, supra note 15, at 3.
38. Id. at 21.
39. Id. at 23.
40. Id. at 24.
41. Digesualdo v. Shea, Civ. No. C-1827, mem. op. at 11 (D. Colo. Mar. 1, 1971).
The Court thus rejected plaintiff's equal protection argument. Moreover, implicit in the
opinion is the Court's view that the Colorado regulation does not violate HEW's "Con-
dition X". The Court found that the regulation was consistent with the goals of the
AFDC program and served legitimate state interests. Id.
42. Id. at 6-10.
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III. CONFIRMATION AND EXTENSION OF THE King ANALYSIS
Although a broad reading of the King decision suggests that a state may
not define the class of eligible individuals more narrowly than as defined in
section 406, Digesualdo suggests that King can also be read to have ad-
dressed only a single word within the section 406 definition. 43 The Supreme
Court apparently recognized these conflicting interpretations of King when
it noted probable jurisdiction in Townsend v. Swank in 1971.44
At issue in Townsend was an Illinois statute that denied assistance to
eighteen, nineteen, and twenty-year olds attending college but provided AFDC
benefits to persons within that age group attending high school or vocational
school. 45 This statute was in clear contrast to section 406 which specifically
includes college students as well as high school and vocational school stu-
dents as dependent children. 46 The three-judge district court panel upheld
the Illinois statute on the ground that section 406 does not "expressly and
unequivocably require states to incorporate the federal definition of dependent
children in their own programs."' 47 Thus, the district court adhered to the
HEW position that section 406 delineates only the outer guidelines of federal
financial participation, and that the states were free to restrict eligibility
within these guidelines. The Supreme Court, however, reversed. 48
In HEW's amicus curiae brief, which essentially restated the view of the
statutory scheme expressed in its Digesualdo brief,49 the agency argued that
Illinois was not bound by the section 406 inclusion of eighteen to twenty-
year-old children attending college, but instead could elect to exclude that
group from coverage under its AFDC plan.5 0 Such an exclusion was also
valid under "Condition X," HEW contended, because it was not unrea-
sonable in light of the purposes of the AFDC program.
The Supreme Court, however, did not agree with HEW's interpretation of
43. Contrary to the approach of the Digesualdo court, most lower courts did follow
the King analysis in resolving eligibility questions under section 406. See, e.g., Stoddard
v. Fisher, 330 F. Supp. 566 (D. Me. 1971); Doe v. Schmidt, 330 F. Supp. 159 (E.D.
Wis. 1971); Cooper v. Laupheimer, 316 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Doe v. Shapiro,
302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969). But see Remmilard v. Carleson, 325 F. Supp. 1272
(N.D. Cal. 1971), aII'd, 406 U.S. 598 (1972); Alexander v. Swank, 314 F. Supp. 1082
(N.D. Ill. 1970), rev'd, 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
44. 401 U.S. 906 (1971).
45. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 4-1.1 (Smith-Hurd 1968); see also Ill. Public Aid Reg.
150.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (2) (B) (1970). See note 13 & accompanying text supra.
47. Alexander v. Swank, 314 F. Supp. 1082, 1087 (N.D. Il1. 1970).
48. 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
49. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282
(1971). See notes 35-42 & accompanying text supra.
50. See Brief, supra note 49.
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section 406, and made it clear that the King analysis was appropriate in this
situation:
Thus, King v. Smith establishes that, at least in the absence of
congressional authorization for the exclusion clearly evidenced
from the Social Security Act or its legislative history, a state eligi-
bility standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance under
federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security Act and is
therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause.51
In applying the King test, the Court first determined that students aged
eighteen to twenty who attended college were eligible under section 406(a) of
the Act. The Court then found no congressional authorization for states
to exclude college students while including students attending high school or
vocational school.5 2  Therefore, section 402(a)(10) required that AFDC
benefits be granted to otherwise eligible college students within this particular
age group.5 3  The Court concluded that because the Illinois statute restricted
eligibility further than the section 406 definition, it was invalid.5 4
Although Townsend appeared clearly to establish the supremacy of the
inclusive federal definition of eligibility, the Court noted probable jurisdiction
in a case involving a similar eligibility issue within one month of the Town-
send decision. 5 In Carleson v. Remillard,5 6 plaintiffs challenged a Califor-
nia regulation excluding from AFDC benefits the families of active duty mili-
tary personnel whose fathers were away from home for extended periods of
time.57  Specifically at issue was whether the state definition of "continued
absence," which excluded absence due to military services, conflicted with
51. 404 U.S. at 286.
52. Section 406(a)(2)(B) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (2) (B) (1970), provides
for the inclusion of 18 to 20-year-olds in attendance at high schools, vocational schools
or colleges. Each state has the option of including these 18 to 20-year-olds in their
AFDC programs. However, the Court made clear that once a state exercised its option
it must either provide aid to all or none of the 18 to 20-year-olds in this category.
53. 404 U.S. at 288.
54. 404 U.S. at 287-91.
In addition, the Court briefly alluded to the equal protection argument raised by
appellees, concluding that "there is a serious question whether the Illinois classification
can withstand the strictures of the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 291. The Court
expressly rejected the HEW position that states may to some extent vary eligibility
requirements from federal standards, limited only by "Condition X": "The principle
that accords substantial weight to interpretation of a statute by the Department entrusted
with its administration is inapplicable insofar as those regulations are inconsistent with
the requirements of § 402(a)(10) that aid be furnished 'to all eligible individuals.'"
Id. at 286.
55. Carleson v. Remillard, prob. juris, noted, 404 U.S. 1013 (1972).
56. 406 U.S. 598 (1972).
57. Cal. Dep't. of Soc. Welfare Reg. EAS § 42-350.11.
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the definition of that term in section 406(a) of the Act. The three-judge
district court panel invalidated the California definition58 and the Supreme
Court affirmed.59
HEW again filed an amicus curiae with the Supreme Court, but modified
the position it had taken in Townsend by distinguishing the definition struck
down in that case. 60  The agency argued that in Townsend the eligibility of
the plaintiff students had been clear from the section 406 definition of
dependent child. However, the Carleson case involved merely a state's clari-
fications of the phrase "continued absence," which the Act had not defined.
Because the Act provided generally that a dependent child was one deprived
of parental care or support due to the "continued absence" of one parent, the
states were free to define or clarify the phrase subject only to "Condition
X." 1  Under that standard, the agency had determined that California's
clarification of the phrase was a reasonable exercise of discretion consistent
with the purposes of the AFDC program. HEW noted that it long had
approved the state plans which excluded these children, because "Congress'
failure to define the federal standard of continued absence may indicate that
the states were intended to have considerable discretion in determining what
sort of parental absence justifies AFDC assistance." 62
Again the Court rejected the agency's interpretation of the Act. In invali-
dating the state regulation the Court applied the King-Townsend analysis.
First, the Court looked to the plain meaning of the term "continued absence,"
concluding that it "accurately describes a parent on active military duty."
63
The Court then found no authorization in the legislative history of the Act
to construe "continued absence" as applicable to some absent parents but not
58. 325 F. Supp. 1272 (N.D. Cal. 1971). The court held that the Social Security
Act does not permit states to exclude as a group dependent children whose parents are
absent due to military service. The court maintained that the Act did not authorize the
State to presume that absence due to military service was not "continued." Moreover,
each case must be viewed in light of its particular facts before making a determination
that the absence is "continued." Although it is not clear that the majority relied on
a King analysis, it is clear that the dissenting judge urged adoption of HEW's position,
and thus would have upheld the California regulation. 325 F. Supp. at 1276-77.
59. 406U.S. 598 (1972).
60. See notes 49-50 & accompanying text supra. It should be noted that prior to the
Townsend decision, HEW had filed an amicus curiae brief in Carleson reiterating its
view that section 406 prescribes only the outer limits of federal matching. However,
after Townsend, HEW filed a second brief, seeking to distinguish that case, presumably
because of the Court's repudiation of their view of section 406. See 1 CENTER ON
SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY ANjD LAW, MATERIALS ON WELFARE LAW 111-25 (1972).
61. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598
(1972).
62. Id. at 14-15.
63. 406 U.S. at 602.
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others. 4 Since these "military orphans" met the federal standard of eligibil-
ity, the state could not deny them assistance by varying the federal require-
ments without express or clearly implied congressional authorization. 5
After Carleson, it appeared that the Supreme Court's position, accepting
federal eligibility standards and rejecting HEW's position advocating state dis-
cretion, was clear: the only permissible definitional restrictions on eligibility
were those established by the federal Act. However, complication of this
straightforward scheme was imminent. In the year after the Carleson de-
cision, an eligibility challenge involving a condition on, rather than a defini-
tion of, eligibility reached the Court.
IV. FEDERAL AND STATE WORK CONDITIONS
In 1967, Congress amended section 402 of the Social Security Act to con-
dition eligibility for AFDC on registration for manpower services, training,
and employment.00 Specific rules for, and exceptions to, these new condi-
tions were enumerated in both the statute and the regulations promulgated
pursuant to the statute. 7 This federal enactment conditioned continued
eligibility on the parent's registration in the federal work incentive (WIN)
program. In addition, many states also conditioned eligibility on partici-
pation in similar state work programs.68
One such state was New York, which, in 1971, enacted its own Work
Rules.6 9 Although most recipients were required to register under both the
federal and state programs, certain persons were required to register for the
state program who were not required to participate in the federal WIN pro-
gram.70 Failure to follow the New York rules rendered an individual
64. Id.
65. Id. at 600-01, 603-04. See note 54 supra.
66. 42 U.S.C. §§602(a)(19), 630 (Supp. V 1975).
67. The Secretary of Labor was designated to promulgate such regulations. 42 U.S.
C. § 602(a)(19)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
68. As of 1973, 22 states had enacted supplementary work programs. Twenty-one
of these programs were enacted prior to the passage of the WIN amendments. See New
York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 412, 414 (1973).
69. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 131(5) (McKinney 1970). This statute required AFDC
recipients to register with local employment agencies and to accept any employment of-
fered. In addition, the state law deems one to have refused employment if he or she (1)
fails to file a statement with the local agency twice each month, attesting that the appro-
priate local employment office states that no suitable position is available, or (2) will-
fully fails to report for an employment interview or the result of a referral or employ-
ment. Id. § 131(5)(a)-(d).
70. As the WIN program was not in operation throughout the entire state, there were
recipients living in areas of New York where there was no WIN program. However,
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ineligible for AFDC regardless of that person's participation in the federal
program. Furthermore, the New York program required, among other differ-
ences, more rigorous proof that the AFDC recipient was in fact actively seek-
ing employment than was required under the WIN program. 71
The New York statute was challenged in New York State Department of
Social Services v. Dublino.72 The plaintiffs argued that under the King,
Townsend and Carleson (King Trilogy) decisions, the imposition of work
rules that were more demanding than the federal program restricted the class
of eligible individuals to a greater extent than the WIN program. Since partici-
pation in WIN was the only federal condition on eligibility, and since there
was no express congressional authorization for a more restrictive state condi-
tion, plaintiffs argued that compliance with the federal condition was suffi-
cient, and, under section 402 (a)(10), aid should be furnished to individuals
otherwise eligible under section 406 who had registered under the WIN pro-
gram. In the alternative, the plaintiffs contended that the federal program
had preempted the New York program. 73
The three-judge court did not reach the issue of whether the King Trilogy
was applicable to the New York Work Rules, but found instead that the fed-
eral program had preempted the state program insofar as it restricted federal
eligibility criteria.74 The Supreme Court, however, reversed this holding and
remanded the case for a determination of whether the state and federal pro-
grams substantively conflicted.7 5
The Court framed the issue as whether federal WIN program participation,
as a condition on eligibility contained in section 402(a)(19), barred a state
from imposing complementary work requirements. 76 Justice Powell's major-
ity opinion reiterated the cooperative federal-state nature of the AFDC pro-
gram. He recognized New York's interest in promoting the self-sufficiency
of welfare recipients and in coping with the state's fiscal hardships as legiti-
mate state interests which should not be interfered with "lightly." The
opinion then examined the congressional intent behind the WIN amend-
ments, and concluded that Congress did not intend WIN to preempt
state work programs: "Far more would be required to show the 'clear mani-
these recipients were still subject to the New York work rules, and could be denied assist-
ance for noncompliance.
71. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 131(5)(a)-(d).
72. 413 U.S. 405 (1973), rev'g 348 F. Supp. 290 (W.D.N.Y. 1972).
73. 348 F. Supp. 290, 295-97 (W.D.N.Y. 1972). Plaintiffs also contended that the
New York rules violated the thirteenth amendment. Id. at 297.
74. Id. The district court found the plaintiffs' argument that the New York Work
Rules violated the thirteenth amendment without merit. Id.
75. 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
76. Id. at 407.
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festation of [congressional] intention' which must exist before a federal stat-
ute is held to 'supersede the exercise' of state action.""7 Clearly holding for
the state on the preemption issue, the Court did not reach the issue of a
possible conflict between the WIN program and the state work rules under
a King Trilogy analysis. Instead, the Court remanded the case for a consid-
eration of the issue of possible conflicts between the state and federal work
programs 78 and directed that "[t]he court below will take into account our
prior decisions. . . . [If there is a conflict of substance as to eligibility pro-
visions, the federal law of course must control. '79
The majority's failure expressly to apply the King Trilogy to the New York
Work Rules may have resulted from the Court's desire to limit its holding
to the preemption question because there had been no factual finding by
the district court on the issue of federal-state conflict. Nevertheless, the
Court's evaluation of the preemption issue suggests the majority's belief that
Congress did not intend the WIN program to be exclusive. Twenty-one
states, the Court observed, had already conditioned AFDC eligibility on par-
ticipation in similar work programs when the 1967 amendment to the Social
Security Act enacted the WIN condition into section 402,80 and Congress did
not indicate that it wished to restrict the operation of those programs.
Furthermore, the Court noted that Congress did not intend the WIN program
to operate in every district in a state, but only in those districts where signi-
ficant WIN participation would be expected.8 1  Consistent with this reason-
ing, the Court may have believed not only that WIN did not preempt state
work programs, but also that passage of WIN without mention of the pre-
existing state programs implied congressional approval of these programs as
conditions on AFDC eligibility.
However, the Dublino Court may not have intended its resolution of the
preemption issue to express any opinion on the validity of the state work
77. Id. at 417. The Court held that "the Act allows for complementary state work
incentive programs and procedures incident thereto-even if they become conditions for
continued assistance." Id. at 422.
It must be noted here that the Court used "preemption" in a special sense. "This
litigation does not involve . . . federal pre-emption of a wholly independent state pro-
gram . . . . The State Work Rules .. .were promulgated as part of the implementa-
tion of AFDC, and are therefore not wholly independent of the federal program." Id.
at 411 n.9.
78. Id. at 423 & n.29.
79. Id. at 423 n.29, citing King, Townsend and Carleson. The decision on remand
has not yet been rendered.
80. 413 U.S. at 414.
81. Id. at 418.
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rules under a King Trilogy analysis.82 Thus, the critical question of whether
a conflict of substance had occurred between the state and federal work pro-
grams was left to the three-judge court to resolve on remand.
In their brief as amicus curiae in Dublino, HEW recognized the validity
of the King Trilogy analysis as applied to definitional questions arising under
section 406 of the Act, but argued that pursuant to the cooperative nature
of the AFDC program, "the states have been left free to impose additional
eligibility conditions unrelated to the specific federal definitions and . . . the
[New York] Work Rules are consistent and in harmony with both the under-
lying purpose of AFDC assistance and the operation of the federal work in-
centive program."' 83  HEW thus drew a distinction between section 406
"definitional" restrictions, which it acknowledged were prohibited by the King
Trilogy, and "additional eligibility conditions," arising independently of the
Act, which HEW considered implicitly allowable where consistent with the
purpose and operation of the AFDC program. HEW concentrated on show-
ing that the New York program complemented rather than conflicted with
the WIN program. This line of argument was apparently addressed to the
preemption issue under appeal, but it may also have indicated the degree
of congressional authorization HEW believed necessary to validate additional
state conditions on eligibility under the King Trilogy test.
While the Dublino majority did not specifically address HEW's position,
Justice Marshall in dissent, disputed its validity. Furthermore, while he did
not feel that the majority had adopted HEW's view, he disagreed with the
majority's inference that passage of WIN indicated congressional authoriza-
tion for state conditions that could possibly restrict AFDC eligibility.8 4 He
argued that Justice Powell's majority opinion had ignored the thrust of the
82. See notes 78 & 79 & accompanying text supra. The Court, however, did refer
specifically to the applicability of the King Trilogy:
In those cases it was clear that state law excluded people from AFDC benefits
who the Social Security Act expressly provided would be eligible. The Court
found no room either in the Act's language or legislative history to warrant
the States' additional eligibility requirements. Here, by contrast, the Act al-
lows for complementary state work incentive programs and procedures incident
thereto-even if they become conditions for continued assistance.
413 U.S. at 421-22. It is unclear whether the Court meant to suggest that a different
test applies to conditions on eligibility or that application of the King Trilogy test would
result in upholding New York's Work Rules. HEW has adopted the former interpreta-
tion, see text accompanying notes 83-84 infra, while Justice Marshall, dissenting in
Dublino, believes the latter to be the correct explanation of the majority opinion. See
413 U.S. at 423-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, New York State Dep't of Social
Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
84. 413 U.S. 405, 423-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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King Trilogy by allowing the state program to be upheld on the basis of
scant congressional intent. Reiterating the Court's position in the King
Trilogy cases, Justice Marshall maintained that before a state may vary
eligibility requirements from the federal standard, a clear statement of
congressional intent to allow such a deviation must be found. Thus, his
argument was not that the majority had applied the wrong test, but merely
that it had sustained the state program without sufficient congressional
authorization.8 5 A finding that state work programs were not preempted,
Justice Marshall believed, was quite different from a finding that they were
affirmatively authorized as conditions on AFDC eligibility.
This latter finding, required under the Court's King Trilogy analysis, had
not been made by the Dublino majority nor by the district court. Thus,
regardless of the disagreement between the majority and dissent concerning
the degree of congressional authorization actually required by the King
Trilogy, both seem to agree that the same standard of review should apply
to state conditions on eligibility as had been applied to state definitional re-
strictions.
In contrast to this reading of the Dublino opinion, HEW has interpreted
the majority opinion as establishing a new standard for testing the validity of
additional state conditions on eligibility that differs from the Court's earlier
application of the King Trilogy standard to "definitional" issues arising under
section 406.
V. AGENCY RECONCILIATION OF THE King TRILOGY AND Dublino
In an effort to reconcile the King Trilogy decisions with its view of the
Dublino decision, HEW revised its regulations. 86 Regulation 233.10, which
previously embodied the "Condition X" doctrine,8 7 was revised to incorporate
the agency position that Dublino authorized a different test for eligibility
issues distinct from those before the Court in the King Trilogy cases. The
regulation thus provides two standards: one applicable to "additional state
conditions on eligibility" and a second applicable to "restrictive state defini-
tions."
According to HEW, definitional issues arise when state eligibility provisions
incorporate definitions which arguably conflict with the definition of de-
85. See id. at 432.
86. Until this time, HEW had not revised 45 C.F.R. § 233.10 (1971) to reflect the
King Trilogy analysis.
87. 45 C.F.R. § 233.10(a)(1)(i), (ii) (1973) provided that states could "provide
coverage on a broader or more limited basis. . . . [T]he eligibility conditions imposed
must not exclude individuals or groups on an arbitrary or unreasonable basis . . ." Id.
See notes 12-18 & accompanying text supra.
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pendent child in section 406. The standard applicable to these definitional
provisions is the King Trilogy standard, restated by HEW as: "A state may
provide more limited public assistance coverage than that provided by the
Act only where the Social Security Act or its legislative history authorizes
more limited coverage." 88
The second standard of review contained in the revised regulation applies
to what HEW terms "additional state conditions on eligibility." This cate-
gory, according to HEW, includes conditions imposed by a state outside the
framework of the federal statute. The published notice of proposed rulemak-
ing includes, as an example of this type of provision, a state requirement that
mothers of dependent children who are concededly eligible under section 406
cooperate with state officials in locating and pursuing the absent parent to
obtain child support payments.89 HEW maintains that the standard of review
applicable to such a "non-definitional" provision is dictated by the Dublino
decision:
A State may impose conditions upon applicants for and recipients
of public assistance which, if not satisfied, result in the denial or
termination of public assistance, if such conditions assist the State
in the efficient administration of its public assistance programs
or further an independent state welfare policy, and are not incon-
sistent with the provisions and purposes of the Social Security Act.90
The promulgation of separate standards of review applicable to "definitional"
and "additional condition" restrictions was consistent with HEW's amicus
brief in Dublino. HEW's revised regulation reflects the agency's belief that
the Court accepted its position that states are free to impose additional condi-
tions on eligibility consistent with the purpose and operation of the federal
AFDC program.9'
V1. CONTINUED VITALITY OF THE King TRILOGY DECISIONS
The revised HEW regulation is predicated on the Dublino decision's actu-
ally having created a different standard of review for additional state condi-
88. 45 C.F.R. § 233.10(a)(1)(ii)(A) (1976). This part of the regulation reflects
the Court's presumption that the more inclusive federal definition is mandatory on the
states, unless a clear showing of congressional intent to the contrary can be shown.
89. Proposed HEW Regulation on Eligibility, 39 Fed. Reg. 16,362-63 (1974).
90. 45 C.F.R. § 233.10(a)(l)(ii)(B) (1976).
91. See note 83 & accompanying text supra. The Dublino majority had in fact recog-
nized New York's interest in the efficient administration of its work program and in
independent state welfare policies. See 413 U.S. at 413. However, the Court at this
point was discussing the cooperative nature of AFDC in the context of possible federal
preemption. It did not appear to recognize these interests as potentially offsetting fed-
eral statutory requirements. But see note 82 supra.
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tions than the standard earlier applied to definitional questions. Had the
Court intended such a dichotomy, the regulation correctly reflects the Court's
intent. However, Justice Marshall's Dublino dissent contended that the
Dublino majority had actually applied the King Trilogy standard to the
New York condition but had relaxed the requirement of showing congres-
sional authorization for such a restriction. 92 Under Justice Marshall's view,
the majority opinion had indicated merely that a state could add conditions
of eligiblity upon a "scant" showing of congressional authorization. On
the other hand, HEW's interpretation of Dublino was that such "state
action" was valid as long as the state provision furthered an independent
state welfare policy consistent with the purposes of the Act.9 3  It was
not entirely clear, therefore, whether Dublino had drawn a distinction be-
tween additional state conditions and restrictive definitions. Although the
next case to reach the Court involved a section 406 definition, the Supreme
Court's decision did shed some light on its view of HEW's two-standard ap-
proach.
Burns v. Alcala9 4 involved an Iowa welfare policy which denied aid to
pregnant mothers on behalf of unborn children. Plaintiffs argued that their
unborn children were "dependent children" within the section 406 definition.
Therefore, applying the King Trilogy analysis, such children must be afforded
assistance under section 402(a)(10), absent clear congressional authorization
for states to limit coverage of their plans to children already born. 95
Under the agency regulation the issue in A lcala would seem to be defini-
tional. Moreover, HEW had always approved state plans that included
fetuses as eligible individuals, indicating that it believed such children to be
within section 406.96 However, in its amicus brief, HEW strenuously main-
tained that the agency did not consider unborn children within the federal
definition. 7  Rather, the agency argued, its regulation authorizing inclusion
92. See notes 84, 85 & accompanying text supra.
93. See notes 90, 91 & accompanying text supra.
94. 420 U.S. 575 (197.5).
95. Id. at 577.
96. HEW had been approving such plans on the basis of a regulation which provides
in pertinent part:
"(2) Federal financial participation is available in:
(ii) Payments with respect to an unborn child when the fact of pregnancy has been
determined by medical diagnosis;
45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c) (2) (ii) (1976).
97. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 11-13, Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575
(1975), cited 420 U.S. at 584-85.
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of such children at the state's option was based on the Secretary's "general
discretionary rule-making authority under Section 1102 of the Act. . . . The
Secretary interprets his authority under that provision as extending to promul-
gation of regulations permitting payment of AFDC benefits on behalf of
individuals other than 'dependent children'. .."9 This option thus was jus-
tified by HEW as a reasonable exercise of the Secretary's administrative
powers, 9 rather than as a permissive restriction on the federal definition.
The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the issue was clearly definitional,
and its resolution warranted only the application of the King Trilogy analysis.
The Court, however, could find no basis for inclusion of unborn children in
either the statutory language of section 406 or the congressional intent under-
lying that section. Therefore, unborn children were not eligible individuals
and section 402(a)(10) did not require assistance for such children. 100
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Alcala was the Court's citation of
authority for its enunciation of the King Trilogy standard. After stating the
King Trilogy test, the Court cited King, Townsend, Carleson and Dublino.l0
Even if Alcala involved only a definitional question, the concurrent citation
of Dublino and the Trilogy cases is a strong indication that the Court did
not consider Dublino a deviation from the earlier cases. 10 2 Simply citing the
King Trilogy cases clearly would have sufficed. The additional citation of
Dublino, without qualification, did not portend well for HEW's interpretation
of Dublino contained in its revised two-part regulation.
VII. A CASE FOR RESOLUTION: Lascaris v. Shirley
The divergence between HEW's interpretation of Dublino and the
Supreme Court's concurrent citation of the King Trilogy and Dublino in
98. Brief, supra note 97, at 13. For an excellent discussion of the agency's reliance
on section 1102, 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970), see Comment, HEW's Power To Grant
AFDC Benefits To Technically Ineligible Individuals, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1359 (1976).
99. The option afforded states in 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(2)(ii) (1976), first arose
in 1941 as an outgrowth of an audit of the Michigan AFDC plan, when the agency de-
termined that it would, as a policy matter, provide federal matching funds to states on
behalf of "medically determined" fetuses. See 420 U.S. at 584. Whether this meant
that the fetus was included in the definition of "dependent child" is debatable.
100. The Court enunciated the applicable standard as it had in the King Trilogy:
"The State must provide benefits to all individuals who meet the federal definition of
'dependent child' and who are 'needy' under state standards, unless they are excluded
or aid is made optional by another provision of the Act." 420 U.S. at 578.
101. Id.
102. For a more recent case involving a definitional issue in which the Supreme
Court has applied the King Trilogy test, with citations to Dublino and the Trilogy cases,
see Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 719 (1975).
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Alcala was evident. The proper standard applicable to state conditions
on eligibility imposed in addition to the specific conditions enumerated
in the Act, however, remained questionable in the absence of a clear
Supreme Court pronouncement. The Court's opportunity to clarify this
aspect of its Alcala opinion came in Lascaris v. Shirley.10 3
At issue in Shirley was a provision of the New York Social Services Law
that conditioned AFDC assistance, to mothers otherwise eligible under sec-
tions 402 and 406, on cooperation with state officials in obtaining support
payments for dependent children receiving AFDC.10 4  The Social Security
Act contained no such condition on eligibility, although section 402(a)(17)
did require participating states to develop and implement a program to secure
such support from the deserting parent. 105
The plaintiff's primary argument was that the King Trilogy test should be
applied. Following this test the New York condition contravened the federal
eligibility requirements of section 406 and, therefore, absent congressional
authorization for such a condition, section 402 mandated the provision of
AFDC assistance. The district court agreed and invalidated the New York
statute to the extent it conditioned assistance on a recipient's cooperation in
securing support payments.10 6 The court observed that New York had
"engraft[ed] a condition on to the Congressionally prescribed initial AFDC
eligibility requirements or on to the grounds for discontinuance of benefits,"
and it could find no authority in the language or the legislative history of the
Act for such a condition. 10 7 Therefore, section 402(a)(10) required New
York to provide assistance even to "non-cooperating" recipients.
103. 420 U.S. 730 (197.5).
104. N.Y. Soc. SEav. LAw § 101-a (McKinney 1970). The state argued that under
the New York law, only the mother's share of the AFDC benefits would be terminated
as a result of her refusal to cooperate, and thus the child was not being penalized. The
district court noted that this argument was "unrealistic" in that any payments made on
behalf of only the children would necessarily go toward support of the terminated parent.
Thus, termination of benefits to the parent would effectively reduce benefits to the child.
See 365 F. Supp. 818, 822 (N.D.N.Y. 1973). Earlier cases had established that assist-
ance to the child could not be denied as a result of the mother's non-cooperation. See,
e.g., Doe v. Lavine, 347 F. Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Doe v. Swank, 332 F. Supp. 61
(N.D. Ill. 1971), af 'd sub nom., Weaver v. Doe, 404 U.S. 987 (1971); Taylor v. Martin,
330 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1971), afj'd sub nom., Carleson v. Taylor, 404 U.S. 980
(1971).
105. 42U.S.C. § 602(a)(17) (1970).
106. 365 F. Supp. 818 (N.D.N.Y. 1973). The district court here was considering
this case for the second time. The Supreme Court had vacated and remanded an earlier
decision for reconsideration in light of the then recently amended New York law. 409
U.S. 1052 (1972).
107. 365 F. Supp. at 821.
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Though application of the King Trilogy standard to an additional state
condition on eligibility was significant of itself, the district court went on to




The court found that the controversy in Shirley was the "very issue" which
the Supreme Court had remanded in Dublino and, therefore, the King Trilogy
standard should apply to this case just as the Supreme Court had directed
application of that standard on remand in Dublino.'0 9 The court also consid-
ered the cooperation condition quite different from the work rules at issue in
Dublino. The WIN program addressed in Dublino and the 402(a)(17) re-
quirement of a state program aimed at obtaining support payments had both
been enacted by the 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act. However,
the court observed, "[a] striking distinction between the two [programs] is that
with respect to WIN. Congress made participation a condition of eligibility,
while Congress has made no such provision in regard to [the section 402(a)
(17) program]." 110 Finally, while the Dublino decision had relied on HEW's
consistent approval of state work requirements, HEW's position had vacil-
lated regarding cooperation conditions."' Therefore, the court found Dublino
supportive of and consistent with the King Trilogy decisions. This was a
direct repudiation of HEW's basis for its dual standard regulation.
In early 1975, Congress effectively overruled the district court's Shirley
decision by amending section 402(a) of the Act to expressly condition federal
eligibility for AFDC assistance on cooperation with a state in obtaining child
support payments.1 1 2  In creating such a condition, Congress arguably
acknowledged that only a specific amendment to the Act could lawfully allow
the operation of a state program, such as that contemplated by the invalidated
New York provision under 402(a)(17). This congressional action, however,
did not moot the appeal from the Shirley district court decision, because the
Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and decided the case prior to the
effective date of the amendment.
1 3
108. Id. at 824.
109. Id. See note 79 & accompanying text supra.
110. 365 F. Supp. at 824 (footnote omitted).
111. The district court noted that the recent amendment to 45 C.F.R. § 233.90
(1973), allowing states to deny assistance to parents or caretakers refusing to cooperate,
was not in the original amendment as proposed in 37 Fed. Reg. 26,737 (Dec. 19, 1972).
Thus, the amendment was "a departure from the agency's past position," and it ran
"counter to the construction placed on the Social Security Act by the courts." There-
fore, the district court refused to accept HEW's asserted position. See 365 F. Supp. at
823-24, and cases cited at 822 nn.5, 7.
112. Social Services Amendments of 1974, PUB. L. No. 93-647, §§ 3(a)(5), 101(c)
(7), 88 Stat. 2348, 2360 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 602, 606). The amendments
became effective July 1, 1975.
113. 417 U.S. 943 (1974). The decision was rendered on March 19, 1975. See
420 U.S. 730 (1975).
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In its amicus brief to the Supreme Court, HEW urged the court to treat
the New York provision as "non-definitional" and apply part (B) of its
regulation to uphold the challenged state condition.1 14  The agency main-
tained that this additional state condition is "a reasonable administrative tool
for accomplishing the statutory objective of establishing the paternity of and
obtaining support for AFDC children."'11  Further, HEW contended
that the Act "allows for" this type of state condition, and that it is not in
"violation of any specific provision" of the Act.116 Thus, the agency argued
that its "Dublino" standard, contained in part (B) of its regulation, was satis-
fied, and consequently that the state condition should be upheld.
Noting the congressional resolution of the conflict, the Supreme Court ren-
dered a per curiam opinion affirming the district court's judgment and citing
as authority Townsend and Carleson.1 1 7 Although Shirley clearly involved
an additional condition on eligibility, in the Court's view the applicability of
the King Trilogy was apparent. Therefore, the Trilogy standard was ap-
plied even though HEW had maintained that this was a situation in which
part (B) of its dual standard regulation would apply. 1 8 Even the agency
should now have to recognize the invalidity of its dual standards. The
Supreme Court had made clear that the only standard by which non-financial
eligibility restrictions-be they "definitional" or "conditional"-could be
measured was that set forth in King, Townsend, Carleson, Dublino and
Shirley.
VIII. ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR FEDERAL STANDARDS
Consideration of the legal and practical effects of a federal standard
provides further support for this interpretation of the Supreme Court deci-
sions. The judicial interpretation not only permits a consistent reading of
all the Supreme Court cases, but its application also proves more manageable
than the dual standard HEW regulation,119 and affects a more socially desir-
able result.
114. See note 90 & accompanying text supra.
115. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Lascaris v. Shirley,
420 U.S. 730 (1975).
116. Id. at 7-8.
117. 420 U.S. 730, 732 (1975).
118. See note 90 & accompanying text supra. By recognizing that the challenged
provision was an additional state condition on eligibility, and by affirming the district
court's application and citation of the King Trilogy cases and analysis, the Court con-
clusively rejected the two-standard HEW regulation.
119. Although further consideration of the HEW regulation should terminate after
Shirley, it has not been directly invalidated. In fact, one district court has upheld it,
See NWRO v. HEW, Civ. No. 264-73 (D.D.C. Jan. 28, 1976), discussed in [1976]
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The long-held agency interpretation of the Act, reflected in the "Condition
X" doctrine and its subsequent codifications, 120 views the Act as allowing
states broad discretion in the administration of their AFDC programs. HEW
believes that the only federal requirements are those expressly enumerated
in section 402 and the general restrictions imposed by "Condition X." In-
deed, the Act contains no language requiring the section 406 definition of
"dependent child" to be mandatory on the states; section 406 is neither
included in nor referred to in section 402. Although part (A) of the re-
vised agency regulation adopts the King Trilogy standard for "definitional"
restrictions, part (B) of the regulation retains HEW's statutory interpretation
for "conditional" restrictions.12 1  Part (B) permits even those additional state
conditions that operate to deny assistance to otherwise eligible needy
children.
Since the King decision in 1968, however, the HEW and Supreme Court
interpretations of the Act have differed. The Court has consistently held that
the federal definition of "dependent child" in section 406 is mandatory on
the states through section 402(a)(10), in the absence of clear congressional
intent to allow state exclusions.1 22 This interpretation of the Act is consistent
with the plain meaning of the Act's language and structure; if section 402
does not incorporate the federal definition of "dependent child," section
406(a) would have little meaning. 12 3  In addition, had Congress not in-
tended to impose section 406 on the states, it would not have delineated
with specificity those needy children for whom the protections of the program
were designed. Where Congress did intend for states to have an option,
it specified such intent clearly, as in the case of eighteen to twenty-year-old
students and children of unemployed fathers.
12 4
This interpretation is also preferable to HEW's insofar as it allows a con-
sistent reading of all the Supreme Court cases. Despite HEW's conclusion to
the contrary, the Court has never indicated that Dublino enunciated a rule
Pov. L. REP. (CCH) 22,130. The court, however, did not cite Shirley in its opinion
even though its applicability was briefed by both parties.
120. See notes 12-18 & accompanying text supra.
121. See notes 88-90 & accompanying text supra. Since part (A) of the agency regu-
lation accepts the King Trilogy decisions and is therefore consistent with the interpreta-
tion advocated in this Comment, the problems discussed are primarily relevant only to
part (B).
122. See Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707 (1975); Lascaris v. Shirley, 420 U.S.
730 (1975); Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975); New York State Dep't. of Social
Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973); Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 282 (1971);
Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
123. See notes 9-10 & accompanying text supra.
124. See note 13 supra.
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separate and distinct from that set forth in the King Trilogy. Rather, the
Court has cited Dublino with King, Townsend and Carleson as if the tests
were identical.' 25 This was made abundantly clear in Shirley when the Court
applied the King Trilogy test to an "additional condition." Thus, such a con-
sistent reading provides a single standard applicable to both restrictive state
definitions and additional state conditions.
On the other hand, application of part (B) of the agency regulation pro-
vides the potential for state abuse and tolerates uncertainty and inequity in
the administration of the AFDC program. This is evidenced in the requi-
site initial determination of whether the challenged state plan provision
is an additional condition on eligibility or a restrictive definition. This deter-
mination is often difficult, if not impossible, as many plan provisions could
be characterized as either. As Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent
in Dublino,12 6 the provision challenged in Townsend127 could have been char-
acterized either as an additional condition that eighteen to twenty-year-old
students attend only high schools or vocational schools, or, as the Court held,
as a restrictive definition. Justice Marshall thus considered HEW's distinc-
tion dubious: "The United States suggests that, while states may not narrow
the class of persons eligible for assistance under federal standards, they may
impose additional conditions on eligibility in pursuit of independent state
policies. This distinction will not withstand analysis, for its makes decision
turn on meaningless verbal tricks."11 2 8
Illustrative of this problem is a state provision requiring the relative caring
for a dependent child to be over the age of eighteen before he or she can
qualify for AFDC on behalf of a dependent child. 129  Such a provision
results in the denial of assistance, for example, to a seventeen-year-old mother
and her infant child. The state would maintain that this mother does
not qualify as a "caretaker relative," even though she is so defined by the
Act.'13 0 If this provision were challenged, the issue could be whether a seven-
125. See notes 101-02 & accompanying text supra.
126. 413 U.S. 405, 424-25 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127. See text accompanying notes 45-54 supra.
128. 413 U.S. 405, 424-25 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall recog-
nized that although the majority of the Court did not clearly reject HEW's position, prior
Court decisions, which were not overruled or limited by the majority, dictated rejection.
It should now be clear that Justice Marshall foresaw not only the pending difficulties
but their eventual resolution as well.
129. A similar Rhode Island welfare policy denying AFDC to unwed mothers under
the age of 18 was invalidated in Lund v. Affleck, Civ. No. 74-36 (D.R.I. Jan. 15,
1975), discussed in [1975] Pov. L. REP. (CCH) 20,475. See also, Roe v. Ray, 407
F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Iowa 1976).
130. The term "caretaker relative" refers to the relative with whom a "dependent
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teen-year-old mother is within the federal definition of an appropriate care-
taker relative, or whether the state may impose this age condition in addition
to its other eligibility requirements for AFDC. Therefore, the threshold ques-
tion before the court would be whether to characterize the plan provision as
a restrictive -definition or as an additional condition. The uncertainty and
the potential for abuse is apparent.
Because the requisite state showing to sustain a challenged provision
varies significantly depending on which standard is applied, the characteriza-
tion or label given a particular provision may effectively determine its
validity. 13 1 Due to the minimal state showing necessary to uphold the provi-
sion under part (B), this provision would likely be upheld if characterized as a
condition.13 2  The state could argue that an independent policy is furthered
by its determination that persons under the age of eighteen are neither suffi-
ciently mature nor responsible to properly care for young children. Finally,
this state provision could be viewed as not inconsistent with any specific pro-
vision or purpose of the Act, as there is no language in the Act regarding
the age of caretaker relatives.
133
However, if this state plan provision were characterized as a restrictive
definition, and part (A)'s King Trilogy analysis were applied, it is far more
likely that the state could not sustain its burden and the provision would be
invalidated. First, because the federal definition of an appropriate caretaker
relative includes "mothers" regardless of age, it is clear that a seventeen-year-
old mother comes within section 406. Second, there is no congressional
authorization for states to select only certain mothers as appropriate. There-
fore, under section 402(a)(10), the state must afford assistance to mothers
under the age of eighteen.
child" is living, and is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 606(c) (1970) as: "The individual who
is one of the relatives specified in subsection (a) [father, mother, grandfather, grand-
mother, . . .1 and with whom such child is living ... in a place of residence maintained
by such individual. . . as his or their own home."
131. Although it is not the case that all state additional conditions will be upheld
under part (B), it is true that this standard is more easily satisfied than the King Trilogy
standard in part (A). The standard in part (B) requires only a showing that the state
provision aids the state in the efficient administration of its AFDC program or furthers
an independent state policy and is not in conflict with any specific purpose or provision
of the Act. However, the part (A) standard requires an affirmative showing of con-
gressional intent to allow the state provision.
132. The requirement, that the state plan provision not be in conflict with any provis-
ion or purposes of the Act embodies the original "Condition X" test and means not in
conflict with any specific provision or purposes. Otherwise, part (A) of this regulation
would be effectively incorporated into part (B) such as to render part (A) meaningless.
133. See note 132 & accompanying text supra.
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One further example of how the initial characterization can affect the
result is seen in a state provision prohibiting all AFDC applicants and
recipients from advocating or participating, by overt acts, in movements pro-
posing change in the form of the United States government by means not
provided in the Constitution.13 4 A state defending this provision would pre-
dictably maintain that it is an additional condition on eligibility and that part
(B) of the agency regulation is therefore applicable. Under this standard,
the provision furthers a state interest in insuring the patriotism and non-
criminal nature of AFDC recipients, and as there is no reference to this type
of provision in the Act, there is no conflict. Thus, the provision would likely
be upheld. However, if judged by the King Trilogy standard, this same
provision would likely be deemed invalid, because there appears to be no con-
gressional authorization for the exclusion of "non-patriotic" individuals other-
wise eligible within section 406.135 Hence, section 402 would mandate
their eligibility. Such confusion regarding the proper characterization of
a state restriction leads directly to uncertainty of results, and more im-
portantly, allows the state to characterize any restrictive provision as a con-
dition subject to the more lenient standard of part (B).
The "loyalty" example is indicative of yet another defect in the application
of part (B) of the agency regulation. Although it may be argued that this
particular condition is reasonable, virtually no controls exist over the states'
ability to impose other conditions under the authority provided them in part
(B) of the regulation. Thus, there is nothing to prevent a "creative" state
legislature from conditioning eligibility on, for example, one's never having
been convicted of a felony, or perhaps never having been convicted of any
crime. Each of these additional conditions could be supported by similar
state arguments-the state could advance an interest in not lending govern-
ment support to criminals or irresponsible citizens. Again, there is no specific
purpose or provision in the Act with which these conditions would conflict. 136
Thus, by offering extremely limited guidelines for the proper scope and exer-
cise of state discretion, part (B) provides the potential for unanticipated, but
rather extreme, state restrictions on AFDC eligibility.
The difficulty and potential for abuse inherent in the initial characteriza-
tion of state plan provisions, and the virtually unlimited state discretion per-
mitted under part (B) for provisions characterized as "additional conditions,"
134. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, CHARACTERISTICS FOR
STATE PLANS FOR AFDC 161 (1974).
135. See Affidavit of Nancy Duff Levy, Jan. 16, 1974, NWRO v. HEW, Civ. No.
264-73 (D.D.C. Jan. 28, 1976) in which the affiant states that there is no express or
clearly implied congressional authorization for such a state provision.
136. See note 132 supra.
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are likely to result in yet another problem-profusion of litigation. Is the
particular plan provision in question an "additional condition" or a "restric-
tive definition?" What is an "independent state welfare policy" sufficient to
uphold an additional condition? To what extent must the condition "assist
the state in the efficient administration of its public assistance programs?"
The agency has provided no guidelines for these determinations. They re-
main to be worked out by the courts, and there appear to be no quick and
easy answers.
In contrast, application of the single standard mandated by the Supreme
Court in Shirley largely alleviates these problems, and allows for greater pre-
dictability and presumably fewer lawsuits. Since the standard will apply to
all plan provisions, there are no characterization problems. Moreover, the
standard is easily applied, involving only an examination of the Act and its
legislative history. This results in greater predictability, which in turn may
sensitize state legislators to the parameters of their discretion and lead to
a realignment of both current and contemplated plan provisions with the
federal standard, and, ultimately, further reduce litigation.
In furtherance of the social purposes of welfare programs, adoption of the
Court's Shirley decision results in a broader and more equitable distribution
of welfare. Even within that group of needy children who lack parental sup-
port or care, the Court's interpretation offers assistance to a greater number
of needy dependent children than does the agency interpretation. Moreover, a
"federalized" standard of eligibility more equitably distributes welfare bene-
fits. Under a single federal standard, AFDC assistance would be less de-
pendent on one's geographical location, but rather would provide the poten-
tial for greater plan uniformity among the states, and thus for greater security
for welfare recipients. 137
Finally, the Court's "federalization" of the program in no way affects the
states' broad latitude regarding fiscal determinations in the administration of
their state programs. 138  The cooperative-federalism nature of the AFDC
program remains; the states retain their right to determine the standard of
need and the percentage of this standard to be paid recipients,'139 remain free
to make these determinations in light of their own fiscal limitations, 140 and
137. Even if part (B) of the regulation were uniformly rejected and states fully com-
plied with the broad federal scope of eligibility, a recipient's residence would still affect
the amount of assistance received and possibly his eligibility. See notes 6-8 & accom-
panying text supra, and notes 138-44 & accompanying text inira.
138. See notes 6-8 & accompanying text supra.
139. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318 n.14 (1968); See also 45 C.F.R. § 233.20
(a)(2) (1976).
140. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318 n.14 (1968).
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may choose among several alternative methods of computation.14 1 Only
minimal federal restrictions have been placed upon the states in this re-
gard.1 42 Thus, the states essentially retain control over financial eligibility,
one of the two primary eligibility requirements.'43
IX. CONCLUSION
Rejection of the existing HEW regulation and acceptance of the judicial
interpretation of the Act promises to offer HEW, states, and recipients some
solution to the conflict and confusion which 'have plagued the AFDC program
during the past few decades. Until Congress acts to provide some welfare
reform, either through amendment of the existing program or through enact-
ment of an entirely new system,144 expeditious implementation of the Court's
directive is critical to the interests of all needy "dependent children." It has
taken eight years of judicial decision to clarify the law; application of that
law must be more timely.
Roberta Rockwerk Brackman*
141. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
142. For example, the state determination of the standard of need must be made on
an objective and equitable basis and the standard must apply uniformly throughout each
state. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(1) (1976); See Boddie v. Wyman, 434 F.2d 1207 (2d
Cir. 1970), af'd, 402 U.S. 991 (1971). In addition, only current and actual income
may be considered in determining an applicant's need. See Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S.
552 (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 602(d)(7) (1970); 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(c) (1976).
Further, the Act required that as of July, 1969, each state must have adjusted the
amounts used to determine the standard of need to reflect changes in living costs. See
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23) (1970). This requirement has been interpreted to prohibit re-
duction of those amounts after the adjustment. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397
(1970).
143. An applicant must meet two basic requirements for eligibility: his or her family
must include at least one dependent child, and that child, or children, must be "needy."
Afforded broad discretion in determining whether an applicant is needy, the states thus
retain control over one, if not the most important, aspect of AFDC eligibility.
144. At the time of this writing the newly elected Carter Administration has already
begun a "welfare reform study" to investigate "every possible avenue for revising the pres.
ent patchwork system." The Wash. Post, Jan. 27, 1977, § A, at 4, col. 3.
* The author gratefully acknowledges the support and assistance of Professor
Nancy Duff Campbell of the Catholic University School of Law in the preparation of
this Comment.
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